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The Uniqueness of Short-  A secured letter-of-credit  loan
allows a lender to  make larger
Term Collateralization  loans than  would  be
permissible  on an unsecured
Leora  K/a pper  basis, maximizing  a risky
borrower's investment  capital.
Empirical evidence  shows  that
secured  letters of credit are
used  by borrowers  who  are
informationally  opaque  and
have  higher  observable  risk.
Such borrowers  also have
fewer  growth  opportunities
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Summary findings
Klapper finds evidence that lines of credit secured by  contracting costs is associated with the borrower's
accounts receivable are associated with business  business risk and the quality of the borrower's  customers.
borrowers with a high risk of default. While an  Empirical tests on a sample of publicly traded U.S.
unsecured short-term loan is repaid from the borrower's  manufacturing firms find that firms with secured line of
future cash flow, a loan secured by accounts receivable (a  credit loans are observably riskier and have fewer
unique form of "inside" collateral) is repaid from  expected growth opportunities.
previously generated and observed sales (the borrower's  Klapper's findings suggest that observably riskier
trade credit terms to its customers). Consequently,  borrowers can borrow more on a secured than on an
lenders that secure accounts receivable are most  unsecured basis. The results highlight the important role
concerned with the credit risk of the borrower's  of secured letters of credit in providing liquidity to risky,
customers and the borrower's  ability to continue to  credit-constrained firms that might not have access to
generate new sales.  external financing through other channels.
A stylized theoretical model demonstrates that the
value of a secured line-of-credit loan in minimizing
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Collateral has attracted an increasing amount of attention as an important feature
in  debt  contracting.2  Academic  interest  in  collateral  is  not  surprising,  given  its
widespread use as an  element in  commercial loan contracting.  In previous  literature,
Berger  and  Udell  (1995)  found  that  over  70%  of  loans  to  small  businesses  are
collateralized.  One type of secured debt contract that has not received enough attention
in the  literature is the secured line  of credit  (L/C), which  provides  commercial loans
secured by short-term assets, such  as accounts receivable and  inventory.  The use of
collateral in L/C loans is particularly interesting because of the important role that L/Cs
play in financing small and mid-size companies.  These companies often obtain critical
working capital financing under a forward contract (L/C) rather than in the spot market in
order to reduce transaction costs and to obtain insurance against credit rationing.
Unlike other types of financing that are routinely collateralized, L/C loans may be
extended as either secured or unsecured.  This choice, however, is not well understood.
Moreover, there has been a striking increase in the amount of loans outstanding under
secured L/Cs.  For  example, the  market  for  loans  under  secured  commercial L/Cs
increased over  100% during the  1990s, accounting for approximately 23% of the total
amount of Commercial and Industrial (C&I) loans at US commercial banks in 1998.3
Despite the increase  in  this  form  of financing,  most  of  the  extant theoretical
literature on collateral is quite general in nature and not  specifically applicable to the
distinctive nature of L/C loans.  The process of secured lending is distinctly different
2 For example,  Barclay and Smith (1997), John et. al., (2000), Rajan and Winton (1995), and Triantis
(2000).
3Secured  lending  amounts  are from the Commercial  Finance  Association  Annual Report, 1999,  and the
C&I  loan amount  is from  the Council  of Economic  Advisers  Annual  Report,  1999.
Ifrom unsecured lending.  Whereas unsecured lending depends on credit worthiness and
risk of borrower default, secured loans are principally based on the liquidation value of
the  borrower's  asset  base.  What  makes  the  secured  L/C  loan  unique  is  that  it  is
collateralized by assets whose ex-ante value is a random variable - unlike fixed assets
whose  depreciation  rate  and  future liquidation  value  is  known  ex-ante,  the value  of
inventory and  accounts receivable  depends  on  whether or  not  the borrower  sells  his
inventory  and  collects his  accounts  receivable.  In  addition,  the  creditor  guarantees
receipt of the firms incoming cash-flow from the sale of inventory and the collection of
accounts receivable via a lockbox or real-time monitoring.
Our model differs from previous  work in  our more detailed description  of the
moral hazard problems that are specific to the liquidation of short-term assets.  Hart and
Moore (1989) show that debt contracts can be  written to the extent that investors can
liquidate  the  borrower's  assets  in  the  case  of  default.  Under  their  conditions,  debt
contracts  cannot  be  written  against  expected  cash  flow  since cash  has  no  value  as
collateral in case of default because it is "divertable".  This is defined as the ability of
management to divert cash funds to non-optimal investments or personal gain.  Accounts
receivable,  which  represent past  revenue  owed  to  the  firm  (the value  of  the  firm's
extended trade credit), also represent the firm's short-term expected cash flow.  Because
the cash  realized  from the  collection  of accounts  receivable  can be  diverted  without
verification, it is difficult to write a debt contract against accounts receivable.  Our model
derives collateralization  of  short-term  assets  as  a  costly monitoring  mechanism  that
ensures that cash collection goes to the lender without the possibility of diversion and
allows a debt contract collateralized by short-term assets to be sustainable.
2The model  addresses  the  problem of  cash  diversion by  allowing  a  lender  to
secure, for a cost, a borrower's accounts receivable explicitly, giving the lender dominion
over  ex-ante  unrealized  cash  flow  to  the  borrower.  The  lender  either  permits  the
borrower to collect the accounts and remit the proceeds to the lender or the lender takes
possession of the borrower's  incoming cashflow directly via a lockbox or by notifying
debtors that there account has been "assigned" to and payable only to the lender.  This
type of lending is costly because the lender closely monitors the creation and collection
of collateralized accounts receivable.
Our theoretical results are confirmed by empirical tests on the use of secured L/C
loans by a sample of firms.  Our sample improves upon previous empirical work, like that
of Berger and Udell (1995), because we have been able to  identify the use of secured
L/Cs  by publicly  traded  companies.  The use of  secured L/Cs by  small firms  is not
surprising since these firms are most likely to be informationally opaque and have fewer
external choices of financing (as found in Gertler and Gilchrist (1993)).  However, the
choice  of  secured L/Cs  by  mid-sized,  publicly  traded  firms  with  a  wider  menu  of
financing is not as obvious.  Analysis of our sample addresses the different, unanswered
question of why public firms would collateralize their short-term assets and absorb the
related monitoring costs.
Using a  sample of public  companies  also  allows us to  test the predictions  of
previous literature finding a connection between a borrower's  choice of financing and
future growth opportunities.  This  sample of firms  allows an  examination of the link
between the use  of secured short-term debt and  the market  value of the firm, which
provides important information about the market's perception of the borrower's risk.  Our
3empirical tests find significant evidence that firms using secured L/Cs are not only
observably riskier but  are  also  perceived by  the  market  to  have  fewer  growth
opportunities. These findings suggest that a firm's ability to borrow on an unsecured
basis depends  on both observed  past performance  and expected  future  success.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 examines previous theoretical and
empirical  literature  discussing  the relationship  of collateral,  liquidity and risk.  Section  3
discusses the  model and motivates the testable hypothesis.  Section 4 presents the
empirical results, which find that firms that include secured L/Cs in their corporate
structure have higher risk, less liquidity and fewer growth opportunities.  Section 5
concludes.
2.  Previous Literature
With few exceptions,  most extant literature  on collateral  is theoretical in nature
and focuses on the role of "outside" collateral,  defined as personal assets pledged by the
borrower  (for  example,  the borrower's  house) not otherwise  collectable  by other  creditors
of the firm. 4 Since outside collateral is a substitute for an equity contribution  by the
borrower,  in general,  the discussion of outside collateral  is only applicable  to privately
held  companies. Alternatively  to outside  collateral,  a firm  may pledge "inside"  collateral,
which  are assets that comprise  the liquidation  value of the firm. Unlike  outside  collateral,
inside  collateral  provides  benefits  to secured  lenders  at the expense  of unsecured  lendes  -
pledging  inside collateral  to one lender effectively  subordinates  the debt of other lenders.
4 An exception is the empirical study by Avery et al., 1998).
4Our paper addresses  the previously  unanswered  question  as to why mid-sized  companies
might prefer  to use inside  collateral.
One theory regarding the appeal of collateral is the "signaling hypothesis"  that
suggests that borrowers  pledge collateral  to signal to creditors their low risk and high
profitability. Bester (1985)  predicts  that high-quality  firms secure with outside  collateral
a greater portion  of their debt than low-quality  firms do, in order to address the ex-ante
information  asymmetry  of the proposed payoff distribution  of the loan at the time the
debt is issued. Since using collateral  is expensive,  only high-quality  firms can afford  the
supplemental  fee without  increasing  their risk of default. Additionally,  Townsend  (1979)
demonstrates  theoretically  that high-quality  firms secure a greater portion of their debt
than do low-quality  firmns  in order  to signal  to the market  their credit-worthiness.
In practice, however, it appears that observably riskier  firms pledge collateral
(Berger  and Udell (1990)). Many firms find that they lack  the credit standards  to qualify
for unsecured  short-term  bank credit and that they can borrow only if they offer some
type of collateral to protect the lender in the case of default.  Rather than offer an
alternative  higher rate, many lenders, in particular finance companies (non-depository
lenders), demand that risky borrowers pledge collateral  to support their loans.  Some
papers explain  this by appealing  to an "agency" (moral hazard) argument. This theory
argues that collateral  is not voluntarily  supplied by borrowers to signal a high quality;
rather, collateral  is offered  to lenders  to protect them from the possible  consequences  of
the ex-post decisions  of borrowers between the time the debt is issued and the loan's
maturity.
5Stulz and Johnson (1985) show that a leveraged firm may undertake  some new
profitable projects with secured debt that it might not otherwise undertake if new equity
or unsecured debt were required.  They discuss the case of a firm with outstanding debt
("debt overhang")  facing financing constraints for positive NPV projects.  In this case
stockholders will not invest because the expected payoff is too low and debtholders will
not invest because the borrower cannot guarantee positive returns.  The authors find that
securing a loan allows a borrower to guarantee positive return to the debtholder in both
the  bad  and  good  state  and  to  secure  financing.  They  argue  that  the  greater  the
underinvestment problem posed by Myers (1977) the more likely that the firm will issue
secured debt.
Additional  literature  on  outside  collateral  includes  Boot,  Thakor,  and  Udell
(1991), who derive conditions under which shareholders would pledge outside collateral.
Their paper finds that  shareholders pledge personal  assets as collateral to  resolve the
problem of asymmetric information about the true value of the firm.  They assume that
borrowers/shareholders have informational advantages over lenders about the true quality
of the firm.  Given these assumptions, they find that private inforrnation causes a positive
relationship between the pledging of collateral and borrower risk.
Previous  theoretical literature  on  inside  collateral  includes  Berger  and  Udell
(1990), who find evidence that observably riskier borrowers are required to pledge firn
assets.  In  addition,  Swary  and  Udell  (1988)  find  that  in  the  case  of  information
asymmetry between the borrower and the lender, pledging inside collateral encourages
optimal firm liquidation.  Their paper finds that riskier and more highly leveraged firms,
6which have a higher probability of default and liquidation, are more likely to use secured
debt.
The consensus in previous literature on collateral is that lenders use secured debt
contracts to address agency and moral hazard problems.  Our model, however, differs
from previous work by specifically linking moral hazard to the liquidation of short-term
assets.  This model determines the conditions under which inside collateral is an optimal
feature for a debt contract to address the agency and moral hazard problems associated
with short-term debt.
3.  The Model
"I don't lend against assets.  I lend against collateral."
- Walter Heller, Founder, Heller Financial.
Hart and Moore (1994) argue that short-term assets, such as accounts receivable
and inventory, should support an optimal short-term working capital (inventory) loan.
This result is supported by Fluck (1997), who finds that an optimal debt contract features
matched maturity of the debt contract and the borrower's  assets (or collateral).  Missing
from their discussion, however, is a distinction between the moral hazards specific to the
liquidation value of a firm's investment in long-termfixed assets (such as equipment) and
short-term variable assets (such as accounts receivable).
In previous literature, the value of a firm's  fixed assets at any point in the future
life of a loan is modeled as the deterministic, ex-ante depreciation rate of the fixed assets,
which  is known by  the borrower  and the  lender  with  certainty.  However, accounts
receivable and inventory are arguably special types of collateral since the expected value
7of the future cash flow that these assets will generate are random variables determined by
the firm's  future sales and collected cash flow.  Accounts receivable are generated by the
sale of inventory, when the firm's  customers are offered trade credit.  The expected value
of accounts receivable depends on the probability that the firm's  accounts receivable will
be collected from the firm's  customers.  Therefore, the expected return of the investment
in  inventory  depends  on  both  the business  risk  of the  firm  (the probability that  the
inventory will be sold) and its customers (the probability that the accounts receivable will
be collected).
Within the framework of the Hart and  Moore (1989) model, the borrower can
costlessly divert cash flow to personal perks.  Therefore, it is costly for lenders to write a
loan  contract  based  on  working  capital  itself  because  the  collection  of  accounts
receivable, which is the source of repayment, represents their transformation into cash
which is divertable without verification.  Our model discusses an optimal security design
for debt contracts written against a borrower's short-term assets by introducing the ability
of the lender to secure the cash proceeds of the borrower's accounts receivable for a cost
of co. 5 If the borrower pledges his short-term assets to a lender, then the borrower is
prevented  from diverting future cash flow for his personal wealth to the extent that it
impairs the repayment of the loan.
A lender who secures his debt with inventory and accounts receivable is legally
entitled to both the liquidation value of the borrower's assets in the case of default and to
5 The cost co  is not a random  monitoring  or auditing  cost,  (as in Townsend  (1979)),  but  rather the cost of
legally assigning  cash flows directly  to the lender. This cost includes,  but is not limited to, the cost of
monitoring  the borrower's  collateral  position  in a real-time  basis and exercising  control  over the borrower's
accounts  receivable  (using  a lockbox,  for example.)
8dominion  over the transformation  of these assets into cash. 6 In addition, a lender who
takes short-term assets as collateral  has a priority claim that extends beyond just the
existing current assets of the borrower;  the law allows for a "blanket lien", which is a
continuing, "floating" security interest in all present and future  current assets of the
borrower. Thus, a lien on current assets gives a lender a claim against all current and
future inventory, current accounts  receivable and future accounts receivable  generated
from the sale of current and future inventory, and all future cash collected from those
accounts  receivable. Whereas  an unsecured lender is unable to verify diversion  by the
borrower,  a secured lender has the legal right to monitor and supervise cash collection
and prevent diversion. By securing  the borrower's accounts  receivable,  the lender can
implement  a monitoring  technology that legally and physically  prevents the borrower
from diverting  cash when the accounts  receivable  are collected.
Our model is restricted  to those firms whose only means of securing short-term
debt contracts is  with  the  collateralization  of  short-term assets (such as  accounts
receivable  and inventory.) We assume for purposes of illustration  that the firm has no
fixed assets to liquidate  in the case of default. This supposition  adds simplicity  without  a
loss of generality and is a reasonable  assumption. For example, this describes  many
small and medium sized borrowers who lease their equipment and do not own any
property. The model also applies to borrowers  who have pledged their fixed assets to
other lenders (a mortgage lender, for example). In this case, the lender is not legally
entitled  to the liquidation  value of the borrower's fixed  assets in the case of default. This
6  A standard secured lien of short-term assets includes  the clause, "Inventory including  proceeds and
products;  account(s)  including  proceeds  and products".
9assumption also applies to technology firms,  which  have no tangible assets and are a
growing segment of asset-based lending. 7
A brief summary of the borrower's decision is as follows: In period 0, the firm is
endowed only with accounts receivable, ARo, that were generated from an investment in
inventory in a previous period. 8 In period 0, the borrower has an option to continue the
game into the next round by re-investing in inventory.  We assume that the borrower's
wealth is limited, such that any investment in inventory must be debt-financed either on a
secured or unsecured basis.  The availability of financing will determine the extent to
which the borrower takes advantage of the option.  Therefore, in general, the choice of
secured versus unsecured debt will turn on which provides more credit availability.
The features of our two period model are as follows: In period 0, the firm begins
with an initial endowment of accounts receivable with an invoice amount of AR0 and an
expected cash value of E  [Ro], which were generated with inventory purchased before
period 0.9 This model requires that the firm began operating and generating sales before
period 0, which  is a necessary condition in  order to  discuss debt contracts secured by
inside collateral.'0 In period 0, the borrower has an option to purchase new inventory,
INO.  This can only be financed with a loan equal to L (INo-L).  Thus, the extent to which
the firm takes advantage of this option depends directly on how much the bank will lend.
Therefore,  in  our model INO is endogenously  determined by  the  value  of L  and the
7 The growth  of receivable  loans  to technology  companies  is evidenced  by the emergence  in 1997  of three
bank subsidiaries  that  target emerging  and growing  technology  companies  for secured  L/Cs.
8 We assume that this inventory was purchased with an earlier endowment of wealth.
9 This model is differentiable from Aghion and Bolton (1992) who assume that an borrower has no initial
wealth.
10  Sources of credit in period t-l  include credit cards,  private equity, and loans secured by personal assets
("outside" collateral).
10borrower  maximizes  his  wealth  by  maximizing  his  profitability,  which,  in  turn,  is
maximized by maximizing his investment in inventory."I
In period 0, the borrower decides whether or not to continue his firm for another
period by re-investing in inventory.  The borrower will only borrow L to purchase new
inventory if the investment has a positive net present value (NPV); that is, the return on
the investment in inventory must be greater then one.  This depends on the probability
that the inventory will be sold, 0, the profit margin on that sale, y, and the probability that
the accounts receivable will be collected, o.  Thus, we measure the return on inventory to
be the productivity of inventory times the probability that the inventory will be realized
as collected cash: y6o0(INo)>1.
The borrower's business quality is measured by 0, where a low 0 predicts that the
borrower will be less likely to sell his inventory.  If the firm sells its inventory (INo) at a
markup of y, it will generate new accounts receivable of AR,, which have an expected
cash value equal to E  [RI].  Since INO  is endogenously determined by the value of the
loan, L, we can express AR, as yL.  However, with probability (1-0), the firm is unable to
sell its inventory and new accounts receivable equals 0.  Without a loss of generality, we
assume that the borrower's  inventory is perishable  and has a liquidation value of 0 in
period 1.12 This measure of the firm's  quality, 0, is observed by both the borrower and
the lender.
The  parameter  6  is the  probability  (on  both  period  0  and  period  1 accounts
receivable)  that  the  firm's  customers will  default  and  that  trade  credit  will  not  be
" We assume that the borrower is risk neutral and has no utility or time preferences.
12 Allowing inventory to have a positive liquidation value in period I strenghtens the models findings.
11collected.  13 The value of 8 varies by firm with the quality and diversity of the borrower's
customers.  With probability 8, the firm collects its accounts receivable and cash equals
ARo (or AR,).  With probability (1-8), the firm's  customers default and cash equals 0.
Both the lender and the borrower know the value of o in period 0.
In summary, the time line for the borrower is as follows:
T=O  T=1  T=2
I  .I  I
ASSETS:
Accounts receivable  Old Accounts Receivable,
=  ARo  ARo, generates Cash = Ro
with probability 3
Inventory  Inventory, INo, generates  New Accounts Receivable,
=  INo  (=L)  New Accounts Receivable  AR,, generates
= AR, (=  yL)  Cash = RI (= yL)
with probability 0  with probability 8
LIABILITIES:
Firm borrows L = INo  Firm owes lender Ro
to purchase Inventory
In period 1, the borrower decides whether to repay the loan to the lender or divert
cash from period 1 accounts receivable, Ro, to himself.  In order for the firm to continue,
the borrower must  repay the  loan, L,  to the lender in order  to  continue borrowing to
purchase new inventory.  If the borrower's inventory is sold and accounts receivable are
collected (with probability 03) then the borrower will always re-pay his loan and continue
'3  The value of 8AR is approximately equal to the accounting methodology of AR less Reserve for Bad
Debt.
12the firm. 14 If the firm does not collect its period 0 accounts  receivable  outstanding,  then
the firm does not have any cash for the borrower  to divert.  However,  if the borrower
collects  his accounts  receivable  but fails to sell his inventory  (with  probability  (1-0)6)  he
will divert  the cash flow  to himself,  since  the lender  will liquidate  the firm.
In addition,  there are additional  costs to the borrower  for a secured loan,  equal to
(l+o)). In period 0, the value of the unsecured  loan, L, and the value of the secured  loan,
L*, are determined. Lenders will only make a loan if the borrower  has verifiable  assets
that can be liquidated at the time  of maturity.  (In order to  guarantee themselves
repayment  in the case that the borrower  defaults). The maximum  amount of the secured
loan, L*, versus the maximum amount of the unsecured  loan, L, available  to the firm
depends,  among  other things,  on the assets  of the firm in period 1 when the loan  becomes
due.
The lender  in this model  has no incentive  to renegotiate  the loan in period 1 since
the liquidation  value of the collateral  does not appreciate  with an additional  period. In
general,  a lender will renegotiate  a loan if the value of the firms is greater in operation
than its salvage value.  The value of accounts receivable, however, depends on the
creditworthiness  of the  debtor and is  independent of the  continuation of the firm.
Consequently, in  the model the  expected cash flow from the  borrower's accounts
receivable  AR, is independent  of the continuation  of the firm past period 1.  In other
words, since the liquidation of the firm, whose expected value is E[RI], is realized in
period 2 with or without the continuation  of the firn,  the lender has no incentive to
renegotiate  with the borrower.
14  The condition  under which  the borrower  initially  invested  in inventory  in period 0, (when  y05([NO)>  1)
ensures  that  the borrower  in our model  will never consume  if he can re-invest  in inventory.  In addition,  in
13The return on the lender's investment depends on the business quality of the firm,
0, and the credit worthiness of the firm's  customers, 6.  For example, if the firm sells its
inventory  with  probability  0  and  collects  its  outstanding  accounts  receivable  with
probability 6, then the lender can be repaid a maximum of Ro, the amount of accounts
receivable outstanding in period 0.  The lender receives this amount regardless of whether
the  loan is secured or unsecured.  However, if the firm sells its inventory but fails to
collect its outstanding accounts receivable, then the firm defaults on its loan since it has
no cash with which to repay the lender.  In this case, the lender collects the expected
liquidation  value  of  the  borrower's  accounts  receivable,  AR,,  equal  to  yL*  with
probability 6 - regardless of whether the loan is secured.
The secured loan, however, is distinguished from the unsecured loan in the case
where the firm fails to sell its inventory but collects its outstanding accounts receivable.
In this  case, which  occurs  with  probability  (1-0)6, because  the  firm did  not  sell its
inventory (and did not generate new accounts receivable), it has no expected cash flow
and is unable to continue.  Therefore, it is optimal for the borrower to divert the collected
cash Ro  to himself and the lender receives zero.  However, a secured lender has dominion
over cash flow to the borrower (that prevents diversion), so as long as the firm collects its
accounts receivable (with probability 6) the lender receives cash flow Ro 0 In this case,
even if the firm does not sell its inventory (with probability (1-0)), the borrower is unable
to divert period 1 cash flow.
Proposition 1:  The borrower will always be able to borrow more on a secured then on
an unsecured basis.
liquidation the borrower would loose the expected cash flow from the successful sale of period 0 inventory.
14For illustrative purposes, Figure  1 plots  the values of a secured and unsecured
loan for varying values of firm quality, 0, and shows that a borrower will always be able
to borrow more on a secured then on an unsecured basis.  L5 The lender is willing to lend
more to  a  borrower  on  a  secured basis  because  the  lender  is protected  against the
borrower's diversion of cash flow.  This result is important because it reveals why this
type of financing is attractive, in spite of its higher cost.  An exception to this proposition
is when 0 =  1, which is the case that the borrower has zero risk of default.  Since the
borrower will never have incentive to divert, he can borrow as much on an unsecured as
on a secured basis.
Corollary  1: As business  quality increases,  the gap between  L * and L becomes  smaller.
Figure  1 also shows that as the quality of the firm decreases (0 becomes smaller),
the amount that the borrower can borrow on a  secured basis, relative to an unsecured
basis, increases.  As the probability that the firm will not sell its inventory increases, the
probability that the borrower will have incentive to divert cash flow to himself increases,
and the marginal benefit to the lender of a secured the loan increases.
The choice between borrowing on a secured versus an unsecured basis depends on
the benefit of increased investment capital versus the cost of secured financing.  The only
state in which a borrower with a secured loan receives a positive return is in the case that
he collects his accounts receivable and  sells his  inventory.  In addition to  loosing the
ability to divert cash to himself, the borrower also incurs the variable cost of secured debt
equal to ooL*.'6
15  We assume realistic values of 8=0.97 and y=2.
153.1 Discussion of the Model
The results of our model are consistent with the conventional wisdom that lenders
collateralize  L/C  loans  to  secure  themselves  dominion  over  the  collection  of  the
borrower's  collected  cash  and  to  determine  ex-ante  the  distribution  payoff  of  the
borrower's assets in the case of default.  Our model finds that in general collateralization
is an optimal contract to address the agency problems associated with short-term debt
when the liquidation value of the borrower's  assets at the time of the loan's  maturity
equals zero (as is the case with accounts receivable).
Our model finds that in the case that the borrower defaults on his loan (when the
borrower  does  not  collect  accounts  receivable  or  diverts  cash  flow  to  himself)  the
liquidation value of the firm depends on the risk of the firm, 0.  (The liquidation value of
the firm is equal to the expected value of accounts receivable generated from investment
INo).  Since 0 is known to both the lender and the borrower, there is the possibility that
borrowers with  an  observably  high  risk of  default  will  underinvest in  positive NPV
projects.  We suggest that high-risk borrowers can maximize the value of their loan by
offering the lender a guaranteed liquidation value in the case of default.
The multi-period feature of a secured L/C loan reduces a borrower's  short-term
liquidity risk and transaction costs by eliminating the need for the borrower to renew his
short-term debt each period when his previous  debt matures.  The L/C loan contract
offers a mechanism that permits a lender to offer a multi-period loan against the expected
cash flow to the firm, by allowing the lender to secure as collateral a 'floating"  security
16 The model's  predictions  are also consistent  for fixed costs  of secured  debt.
16interest in the borrower's present andfuture  accounts receivable.'7 In general, the lender
will  loan  a  collateral margin  of  the  borrowing  base  and  the  loan  is  repaid  as  the
borrower's accounts receivable are collected. 18
In  addition,  multi-period  L/C  loan  contracts  often  do  not  include  restrictive
covenants (such as compensating balances) since a secured lender has the right to revoke
the L/C if the loan is not repaid  (if the borrower defaults) or if the borrower fails to
generate new accounts receivable  to  act as collateral.  This provides  the lender with
information not only about the value of the collateral, but also about the firm's  solvency
and overall performance.  This information includes real-time sales, account receivable
and  inventory turnover,  customer  quality,  returned items,  and  product  quality.  This
extensive information about the  borrower's  short-term assets  and  liabilities gives the
lender an early warning of deterioration of the quality of the borrower's  performance.  A
secured L/C loan offers the borrower the advantages of long-term debt while providing
the lender an uncontingent right to withdraw the loan, even in the case that the borrower
does not default.
In addition, the return to the lender on a secured L/C does not depend on the
credit risk of the borrower.  For this reason, receivable loans are often used for financial
restructuring.  A borrower's  current lender may demand to be repaid if the borrower is
underperforning,  if the borrower is highly leveraged, or because of "lender fatigue" (for
exarnple,  if  the lender  decides  to  call  in  all  loans  in  a  specific  sector or  industry).
However, if the borrower has accounts receivable on his balance sheet, he may turn to a
secured lender as a "lender of last resort".  As stated by a secured lender at Congress
17 The standard clause  in the UCC secured lien filing lists as collateral:  "Accounts receivable  including
proceeds  and  products".
17Financial, "They were one step away from Chapter 11.  The two things we were able to
offer  them  was  time  and  liquidity."'9 An  attractive  feature  to  credit-constrained
borrowers is that lenders will often quickly lend capital based on the creditworthiness of
the borrower's collateral, without performing lengthy credit evaluation of the borrower.
This suggests that higher-risk firms are more likely to use secured debt.
In previous literature, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that collateral can be
used  by  lenders to  control  for  the  agency  problem  of  asset  substitution  (borrowers
substituting riskier for less risky assets).  Since a firm is legally prohibited from selling an
asset secured with a lien, an asset pledged as collateral is not marketable and cannot be
replaced with a riskier asset.  Lenders may therefore secure a borrower's assets to address
the  incentive of managers of highly  leveraged firms to increase  the riskiness of their
business (and the likelihood of default).  This suggests an additional objective unique to
receivable loans: Since accounts receivable are equal to  future cash  flow, their use as
collateral can maximally restrain management from diverting future collected cash (the
return on the lender's investment) into personal perks, such as salaries and expenses.  By
securing a borrower's accounts receivable, a lender can limit managerial discretion over
cash.
4.  Empirical Analysis
Collateral is an attractive debt-contracting feature because it gives the lender a legal
priority to the full liquidation value of the collateral in the case of default.  In previous
literature, Scott (1986), Leeth and Scott (1991), and Triantis (1994) find that secured debt
18  This  is equivalent  to the "slowest  repayment  path" in the Hart and  Moore (1989)  model.
18alleviates the costs of bankruptcy and can be used to the greatest advantage by a firm
with the highest risk of default.  They argue that the use of collateral reduces foreclosure
costs  (such  as court  and lawyer fees)  by  determining  ex-ante the  distribution  of the
liquidation  value of  the borrower's  assets in  the  case of  bankruptcy.  Their findings
suggest that firms with higher liquidation values (relative to asset value) would be more
likely to use secured debt.  For example, firms with highly specialized assets would be
less likely to collateralize.
There is scarce previous literature that tests empirically the use of secured debt.
Titman and Wessels (1988) support previous theoretical claims that firms with unique or
specialized products have relatively low debt ratios.  They argue that small and medium
sized firms are more likely to collateralize, since very large firms may be too expensive
and complex to liquidate and therefore consequently their collateral is not as valuable.
Berger and Udell (1990) find that secured loans have a greater likelihood of default.  By
implication,  they  conclude  that  secured  borrowers  must  be  riskier  than  unsecured
borrowers.
Berger and Udell (1995) test the use of secured L/C loans by a sample of small
firms of which nearly all of the firms are privately owned and asset size ranges up to only
$219 million.  They find evidence that both risk and information asymmetries determine
a firm's  use  of secured debt.  They find that the probability of pledging collateral is
significantly  related  to  the  age  of  the  firm  and  the  length  of  the  firm's  banking
relationship  (two  signs  of  information  opaqueness)  and  the  firm's  leverage  ratios
(measures of  firm risk).  However,  this  is  not  surprising  given the  limited  external
19 "Ailing Retailers Get Breathing Room as Asset-Backed Loans Gain Acceptance",  Wall Street Journal,
June 20, 1997.
19financing  options of small firms. Our empirical  tests address  the broader  question of the
choice  of public companies,  with alternative  financing  venues (such as equity  and public
debt)  to use secured  L/Cs.
4.1 Data Description
A sample was randomly  drawn of 850 publicly traded manufacturing  firms that
were listed in Compustat  in 1996  and were traded  between  the years 1991  and 1996.20  To
identify  firms  with secured  revolving  L/C loans,  we searched  in LEXIS/NEXIS  (a private
legal information  provider) for our sample firms for UCC liens outstanding against
accounts  receivable. 21 The UCC lien includes the date of the filing,  the debtor's name,
the creditor's name,  and a description  of the collateral. The inclusion  of this information
allowed us to distinguish  between  loans secured  by fixed and "floating" assets (such as
accounts  receivable). Firm-level  data was collected  from Compustat  and CRSP. 22
4.2 Variable  Descriptions
A. Size, Age, and Growth Variables
We find in previous  literature  that size and age significantly  affect  a firm's ability
to obtain  external  financing. This result is also predicted  in our model, which finds that
more  informationally  opaque  firms should  be more likely to require  collateral. Summary
statistics  of our sample  support  these findings:  The median size of assets of firms without
secured  L/Cs is $174.22  million  while  the median size of firms with secured  L/Cs is only
20 This represents  65% of all manufacturing  firms listed in Compustat  (SIC codes beginning  with 2 or 3).
Summary  statistics  for this subsample  are significantly  insignificant  from the full sample.
21 In order to claim priority  to a secured  asset in the case of default, a lender  must legally file in court a
UCC  lien  against  the asset(s). Consequently,  we can acertain  that any outstanding  liens  would  be included
in Lexis/Nexis. In addition, SEC 10-K filings were checked to confirm that liens were not filed by a factor,
an unpaid creditor, or for a securitization.
22 Financial ratios were corrected for outliers above and below 95% and 5%, respectively.
20$53.0 million (Table 1).  Total sales for firms with and without secured short-term debt
are $68.48 million and $209.32 million, respectively.
Gertler  and  Hubbard  (1989)  examine  a  cross-section  of  public  and  private
manufacturing firms and find that the percentage of long-term debt received from banks
declines with an increase in the size of the firm.  They show that smaller firms are more
credit-constrained and  have less access to credit.  In addition, they find that a  firm's
"collateralizable" net worth is a determinant of the amount and terms under which a firm
can borrow.  Our results find that firms exhibiting credit constraints are most likely to
pledge collateral (to increase the size of their loans).  This suggests that smaller firms
would  be  more  likely  to  have  secured  debt  outstanding.  Firm  size  is  measured
alternatively as the logged value of total  assets, total sales, and number of employees,
ASSETS, SLAES, and EMPLOYMENT, respectively, and is expected to be smaller for
firms with secured accounts receivable.
In addition, the probability of a firm's failure decreases with age, which implies
that a younger firm has a greater risk of default.  However, our variable AGE, measured
as the number of years publicly traded, does not account for changes in a finn's  focus
over time.  For example, an older manufacturer (originally of typewriters, for example)
who changed the nature of his business over time may have a risk of default similar to the
risk of a young firm.  To identify firms that have changed their business direction, our
regression also includes the average of annual growth in the number of employees over
five years, EMPLOYGR5.  We suggest that a positive growth in employment signals that
a firm is experiencing growth.  Therefore, a  growth in  employment should indicate a
younger firm and should be positive for borrowers with secured L/Cs.
21B. Leverage  and  Liquidity Variables
Our model predicts that when a borrower's  riskiness and probability of default
increases, the likelihood that the lender will demand collateral increases.  Lenders use
liquidity  ratios,  which  measures  a  firm's  ability  to  meet  short-term  liabilities  by
converting  illiquid short-term assets  (such as  accounts receivable  and  inventory) into
cash, to measure a borrower's risk of default.  Low liquidity ratios can prevent firms from
borrowing from conventional cash flow lenders to finance positive NPV projects.
Carey et al. (1998) finds that finance companies, which, in general, specialize in
secured receivable financing, have significantly riskier, more leveraged borrowers.  Our
regressions  include  liquidity  ratios  to  test  if  risky  firms  that  are  unable  to  access
alternative sources of credit use secured L/Cs.  Accounts receivable (assuming standard
payment terms within the range of 30-60 days) are the most liquid asset a business has,
short of cash, since the lender can collect the proceeds without a third party.  This differs
from  other assets,  such as equipment, which  must first  be sold.  Therefore,  accounts
receivable  are the easiest  asset for  credit-constrained borrowers to  use  as a  potential
source of credit.  Since the amount of a secured loan only depends on the borrower's past
performance and ability to  collect its accounts receivable, firms also turn  to receivable
lenders as a "lender of last resort" after violating traditional bank loan covenants, such as
liquidity ratios.
The most common measure of liquidity is the current ratio, CURRAT, which is
measured as current assets divided by  current liabilities.  This  is a broad  measure of
short-term working capital.  This measure assumes, however, that the borrower could
liquidate its cash holdings, security investments, and inventory, in  order to  pay off its
22creditors.  A alternative measure of liquidity is the quick ratio, QUICKRAT, which is
measured as current assets less inventory divided by current liabilities.  This may more
accurately  reflect the inability  of firms  to  liquidate their  inventory during periods  of
distress.  In addition, we include the market value of leverage, LEVERAGE.  We expect
that firms with secured accounts receivable will exhibit greater liquidity risk.
C. Turnover Variables
Short-term risk may also depend on a borrower's trade cycle, which is measured
by the borrower's  turnover ratio of current assets into cash.  A slow conversion cycle
indicates a greater risk of default.  We use two turnover ratios: The accounts receivable
turnover  ratio,  ACCPAYTURN,  measured  as  accounts  receivable  divided  by  sales,
suggests how  long it takes a  company to  collect  from  its customers.  The inventory
turnover ratio, INVENTURN, measured as inventory divided by the cost of goods sold,
indicates how quickly a company sells its inventory.  We expect that firns  with secured
L/Cs  should have relatively strong accounts receivable - since these firms need high-
quality  accounts receivable  in  order  to  receive  financing,  we  expect  a  self-imposed
discipline on the part of the borrower to restrict trade credit to high-quality customers. In
contrast, we expect that firms using secured L/Cs should have greater business risk and
slower inventory turnover.
D. Future Growth Variables
In previous literature, Opler et.  al (1997) find that a firm's  corporate financing
decisions depend on various measures  of the borrower's  future  growth opportunities,
measured  as  the  market-to-book  ratio.  Barclay  and  Smith  (1995)  use  Compustat's
breakdown of long-term debt priority classes to  explain variation in priority structure.
23They  find  evidence  that  firms  identified  as  lower  quality  and  having  fewer  growth
opportunities have  fewer  financing choices  and  consequently  a  greater  percentage of
long-term debt is secured.  However, their sample is limited to the collateralization of
fixed,  long-term assets, which do not feature the moral hazard problems discussed in our
model.  We  extend  their  finding  and  test  the  relationship  between  short-term  debt
collateralization and future growth.  We expect that the intuition in the previous literature
also applies to firns  short-term financing choices, and we expect to find that firms with
less expected growth opportunities are more likely to use secured L/Cs.
One measure  of  potential  future growth  is the  ratio  of market-to-book value,
MKTBK, which is the market's perception of growth opportunities.  A second measure is
(pseudo) Tobin's-q,  TOBINQ, which is a measure of the market's  assessment of a firm's
investment opportunities. 23 A third measure  is the ratio  of research  and  development
expenditures to sales, RDSAL, which predicts the development of future projects,. 24 We
expect that firms with fewer growth opportunities should be more likely to use secured
L/Cs.
E. Dummy Variables
The first dummy identifies firms that paid dividends in 1995, D-DIVPAY.  We
expect firms with secured accounts receivable to be less likely to pay dividends.  Stulz
and Johnson (1985)  suggest that  secured borrowers would not  pay dividends because
collateral prevents asset substitution, discouraging borrowers from selling collateralized
asset in order to pay dividends.  If secured accounts receivable control the borrower's
23 We test a (pseudo)  Tobin's-q,  which is approximated  as the book  value of debt plus the market  value of
equity  divided  by total assets.
24access to cash, then it would reduce the ability of the borrower to pay dividends.  In
addition, this dummy tests if credit-constrained borrowers choose to reduce or eliminate
dividends in order to provide additional liquidity. 25
A second dummy is included that equals I if the firm paid no dividend payments
in  1995, but paid  dividends at least  once during  1901-1994, D-PREDIV.  This tests
whether firms reduce dividend payments during  financial distress.  Fama and French
(1997) argue that firms do not reduce dividends to increase internal funds.  Their paper
refutes  the  "pecking  order"  theory,  which  suggests  that  there  exists  a  hierarchy  of
financing options and that cheaper, internal financing is preferred to expensive, external
financing.  This dummy tests if indeed firms that are dependent on an expensive source of
credit, such as secured L/Cs, maximize their internal sources of cash.
A third dummy is included for firms that have a bond rating, D-BNDRAT.  A
bond rating indicates an access to public markets, which offers an additional source of
liquidity and reduces potential credit strains.  It is expected that firms that have a bond
rating are less likely to be dependent on secured debt.
4.3 Econometric Specifications and Results
To test whether firm characteristics determine the use of L/C loans secured by
accounts receivable,  we  estimate  using logit  discrete  choice  models equations of the
form 26:
24 Opler et  al. (1996)  found  that highly  leveraged  firms  that performed  badly had higher  R&D divided  by
sales, since  this indicates  firm-specific  assets  that are more  vulnerable  to economic  downturns. However,
we find  this ratio  significantly  negative  for firms with  secured  debt outstanding.
25 In addition,  firms are only likely to offer dividends  if they are confident  of their future cash flows and
ability  to continue  payments.
26 Alternative  specifications  are shown  in  brackets.
25SECLC  =  a  + PI  Ln(ASSETS) {Ln(SALES), Ln (EMPLOYMENT), AGE)
+ P2 EMPLOYGR5
+  P3 CURRAT {QUICKRAT,  LEVERAGE)
+  P4 INVENTURN {ACCRECTURN}
+  p5  MKTBK  {RDSAL,  TOBINQ}
+  P6 D-DIVPAY + 17 D-PREDIV + P8 D-BNDRAT +  l  (l)
All of the variables shown in equation (1) are described in Table 1, except for the
random error term s1. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the variables tested in the
model.  Table 2 shows univariate tests of whether the means of secured and unsecured
firms are significantly different from each other.  The reported results show that secured
borrowers have significantly smaller amounts of total assets, sales, and employment, and
significantly  slower  employment  growth.  Secured  borrowers  show  signs  of  being
significantly liquidity constrained and slower to turn over their inventory.  The market
seems to perceive these firms as having fewer growth opportunities and as less likely to
pay dividends.  These financial indicators strongly suggest that smaller, less liquid firms,
with lower predicted future growth are significantly more likely to use secured accounts
receivable for financing.
Also  included  in  the  summary statistics  is  the  Altman  Z-Score,  ALTMANZ,
which is used as a predictor of bankruptcy and liquidation.  The Z-Score combines five
financial ratios,  assigning  each  a  different  weight.  It  includes:  net working  capital,
retained earnings, interest earned, market-to-book, and sales.  A lower Z-Score suggests a
higher likelihood that the business will go bankrupt in the following year.  The median Z-
Score for firns  with secured short term debt is significantly larger then the Z-score for
26firms  without secured accounts receivable,  which  offers further evidence that lenders
demand collateral to protect against a high risk of default. 27
Table  3  shows  logit  regression  results.  Columns  (1)-(4)  show  that  size  is
significantly negatively related to the use of secured L/C loans.  This is consistent with
our model's prediction that larger, less informationally opaque firmns  should be less likely
to pledge collateral.  This result is also robust to the substitution of Ln(ASSETS) with
Ln(SALES)  and Ln(EMPLOYMENT), not shown.  AGE is not statistically significant,
but as predicted, 5-year employment growth, EMPLOYGR5 is significantly positive in
all  regression  specifications.  An  increase  in  employment  signals  that  a  firm  is
experiencing  growth and  may  be  either  a  new  firm  or  an  existing  firm  entering  or
expanding into  a new  line of  business.  Since it  is difficult to  determine the  future
earnings of a firm that is young or in transition and because growing firms often need to
maximize  their  debt  capacity,  a  firm  with  high  employment  growth  may  be  credit
constrained.  This is consistent with  our finding that a  firm with higher employment
growth is more likely to use secured L/Cs.
We evaluate the economic significance of firm size in our model by simulating
the effect of doubling the size of the firm's  asset size and calculating the change in the
probability of using a secured L/C, starting from the subsample means for P(SECLC).
We find  that  with  a  doubling  of  firm  size,  the  probability  of  using  a  secured L/C
decreases  from  19.2%  (as  shown  in  Table  1)  to  15.35%.  This  amounts  to  an
economically significant 20% decrease in the probability of using a secured L/C loan.
27  The Altmnan  Z-Score is not used in the regression since it is highly correlated with other variables being
tested.
27Additionally we find that a doubling of firm employment growth increases the likelihood
of using a secured L/C loan by almost 40%.
As  shown  in  Table  3,  liquidity,  proxied  by  the  current  ratio,  CURRAT,  is
significantly negative for all 4 specifications.  This result is robust to the substitution of
the quick ratio, QURAT, and leverage, LEVM.  This suggests that firms with secured
accounts receivable are more exposed to short-term default and pose a greater business
risk of default.  As shown in the model, since the amount of a secured L/C depends on
customer risk rather then firm risk, borrowing against accounts receivable permits a firm
to borrow greater amounts then would be permitted on an unsecured basis.  We find an
economic significance of the doubling of CURRAT is a 20% decrease in the likelihood of
using a secured L/C loan.
Table  3  also  shows  that  inventory  turnover,  INVENTURN,  is  significantly
positive for all specifications.  This indicates that firms with secured accounts receivable
are more likely to  have longer inventory turnover  and benefit  most from the flexible
payment schedule of a L/C loan.  This result suggests that secured borrowers are those
firms whose financial ratios indicate too high a default risk to borrow on an unsecured
basis.  We find that the economic significance of doubling the inventory turnover is a 4%
increase in  the  likelihood of using  a  secured L/C  loan.  We also  find that  accounts
receivable turnover, ACCRECTURN, is insignificantly different for the two groups of
borrowers (not shown).  This is consistent with our prediction that receivable financing is
attractive to  borrowers that  have a  large  amount  of  high-quality  accounts receivable
relative  to  borrowing  needs.  (In  other  words,  although  secured  borrowers  are
characterized as higher risk, their accounts receivable are not distinguishably riskier).
28Table  3,  columns  (1)  and  (2)  show  alternative measures  of  expected  future
growth.  Two measures of market perceived future growth, market-to-book, MKTBK,
and  (pseudo) Tobin's-q,  TOBINQ,  (not  show),  and  the  firm's  indicator of  potential
growth,  R&D-to-sales,  R&DSAL,  are  all  significantly  negative.  These  regressions
strongly suggest that firms who use secured L/Cs are perceived as having lower future
earnings and  sales  and  a higher  risk of  future default.  Furthermore, we  find that  a
doubling of MKTBK and RDSAL results in a 5% and 8% decrease, respectively, of using
a secured L/C loan.
Table 3, columns (3) and (4) include dummies identifying whether the borrower
has alternative sources of  credit.  Column (3) finds that firms  that pay dividends are
significantly less likely to have secured debt outstanding.  Consistent with the hypothesis
that a secured L/C loan is an expensive loan "of last resort", this test finds that secured
L/Cs  are less likely  to  be used by  firms that could raise internal capital by reducing
dividend payments.  Additionally, we find that the economic significance of eliminating
dividend payments increases the likelihood of using a secured L/C loan by almost 80%.
Column (4) finds that  firms that reduced  dividend payments within the past  5
years are more likely to use a secured L/C loan.  This suggests that dividend payments
are reduced by  credit  constrained  firms.  We find  the  economic  significance of  not
reducing dividend  payments in  the past  5 years  decreases  the  likelihood of  using  a
secured L/C loan by over 100%.  We also find that a dummy indicating a bond rating is
insignificantly different from zero, confirming our previous assertion that a secured L/C
used for working capital purposes is not a substitute for long-term debt (not shown).
29These empirical  tests also include SIC dummies  to correct for industry  effects  (not
shown). Dummy  variables  are included  for nine 2-digit  SIC codes  that identify  industries
that include at  least 25  firms in  our sample.  The SIC dummies are  statistically
insignificant,  except for SIC code 36, "Electronic  and Other Electric Equipment". This
result is not surprising, since this industry is characterized  by high levels of inventory
turnover  and sales.
5.  Conclusion
The  risk of  an  unsecured  short-term  loan is measured  by  the  strength of the
borrower's  balance sheet and financial statements and the borrower's  proven ability to
generate new sales and repay the loan in the short-term.  Whereas an unsecured loan is
repaid from the borrower's  future cash  flow, a loan secured by accounts receivable is
repaid from previously generated and observed sales (the borrower's trade credit terms to
its customers).  Therefore, lenders that secure accounts receivables are most concerned
with  the  credit  risk  of  the  borrower's  customers and  the  ability  of  the borrower  to
continue to generate new accounts receivable.
Most extant  literature  on collateral focuses on  the use  of  "outside"  collateral,
which are the personal assets of the borrower and which are not otherwise collectable by
the lender in the case of default.  This literature does not explain the nature and use of
secured L/C loans, since accounts receivable are a  unique form  of "inside"  collateral,
which  are assets that  comprise the  liquidation value of  the firm  and  which  shift the
priority structure of the borrower's  assets in the case of default from the unsecured to
secured lender(s).  Our paper presents the first model  to explicitly  discuss conditions
30under  which inside collateral is an optimal feature  for a debt contract to  address the
agency and moral hazard problems associated with short-term debt.
Our  theoretical  model  motivates  a  secured  L/C  loan  contract  as  a  costly-
monitoring mechanism for risky firms to address the moral hazard of diversion in the
case of business default.  We show that a secured L/C loan allows a lender to make larger
loans  then  would  be  permissible  on  an  unsecured  basis,  thus  maximizing  a  risky
borrowers  investment capital.  The  model's  predictions  are  supported  by  empirical
evidence  that  secured  L/Cs  are  used  by  borrowers  characterized  as  being  more
informationlly opaque and having observably higher risk.  In addition, we find that firms
that use secured L/C loans have less future growth opportunities and are less likely to pay
dividends.  Our results highlight the important role of secured L/Cs in providing liquidity
to risky, credit-constrained firms that may not be able to access other venues of external
financing.
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33Table 1: Summary  Statistics
Summary  statistics  are for a sample  of 821 manufacturing  firms in  1995.
Variable  Name:  Definition:  lMean:
Secured  LIC  Loan  Dummy (Dependent  Variable)
SECLC  I=  if the firm has an outstanding L/C loan secured by accounts receivable, 0  19.2%
otherwise
Size, Age, and Growth Variables:
ASSETS  =  Total Assets (millions)  $1,414.76
(Median)  ($124.55)
SALES  =  Total Sales (millions)  $1,546.61
(Median)  ($154.66)
EMPLOYMENT  =  Total Employment (thousands)  7.34
(Median)  (1.07)
AGE  = Number of Years Traded  29.87
EMPLOYGR5  5 Year Employment Growth  6.01%
Liquidity  and  Leverage  Variables:
CURRAT  =  Current Ratio, measured as the ratio of current assets to total liabilities  2.82
QUICKRAT  =  Quick Ratio, measured as the ratio of current assets less inventory to total  1.92
liabilities
LEVERAGE  =  Leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to the market value of assets  0.54
|______________ l(total  liabilities plus the market value of equity)
Turnover  Variables:
INVENTURN  =  Inventory  Turnover, measured as the ratio of inventory to cost  of goods  99.56
sold
ACCRECTURN  =  Accounts  Receivable  Turnover,  measured  as  the  ratio  of  accounts  64.89
receivable to total sales
Future  Growth Variables:
MKTBK  =  The ratio of the market value of equity as a percentage of the book value of  2.94
equity
RDSAL  =  The ratio of research and development expenses to total sales  0.06
TOBINQ  =  (Pseudo) Tobin's-Q,  measured as the ratio of the  market value  of assets  0.96
(total liabilities plus the market value of equity) to the book value of assets
Dummy Variables:
D-DIVPAY  =  I if a firmn  pays dividends, 0 otherwise  44.12%
D-PREDIV  =  1 if  a  firm  currently  does  not pay  dividends,  but  previously  paid  out  8.85%
dividends within the past 5 years, 0 otherwise
D-BNDRAT  =  1 if the firm has a bond rating, 0 otherwise  21.03%
Bankruptcy Prediction Variable:
ALTMANZ  = Altman  Z-Score:  a  weighted  average  of  net  working  capital,  retained  3.41
earnings,  interest  earned, market-to-book, and sales.  A  higher Z-Score
suggests  a  lower  likelihood  that  the  business  will  go  bankrupt  in  the
following year.
34Table 2:  Univariate Tests of the Determinants of
the Use of Secured L/C Loans
Summary statistics are for 1995. Variable names are defined in Table 1. Asterisks
(***,  **,  *)  denote  statistical  significance  at  the  1%,  5%,  and  10%  level,
respectively, for a two-tailed Wilcoxon two-sample test (dummies are not tested).
Asterisks are placed next to the value that is significantly larger.
______________  X_________  (1)  (2)  (3)
Full Sample  No Secured  Secured
L/C Loans  L/C Loans
Number  of Observations  821  663  158
Size, Age, and Growth Variables:
ASSETS  1414.76  1719.20...  137.26
(Median)  (124.55)  (174.22)  (53.00)
SALES  1546.61  1863.76  215.77
(Median)  (154.66)  (209.32)  (68.48)
EMPLOYMENT  7.34  8.79  ~  1.31
(Median)  (1.07)  (1.34)  (0.53)
AGE  29.87  29.85  29.94
EMPLOYGR5  0.06  0.06  0.090
Liquidity  and Leverage Variables:
LEVERAGE  0.54  0.28  _|  0.72
CURRAT  2.82  T  2.93  T  2.37
QUICKRAT  1.92  r  2.05  - 1.39
Turnover  Variables:
ACCRECTURN  64.89  65.11  63.99
INVENTURN  99.56  96.16  1 13.70-
Future  Growth  Variables:
MKTBK  2.94  3.02-  2.58
RDSAL  0.06  0.07  0.05
TOBINQ  0.96  0.99-  0.80
Dummy Variables:
D-DIVPAY  0.44  0.52  0.11
D-PREDIV  0.08  0.06  0.15
D-BNDRAT  0.21  0.24  0.10
Bankruptcy  Prediction  Variable:
ALTMANZ  3.41  3.60  2.76
35Table 3: Logit Tests of the Determinants of the Use of Secured L/C Loans
Summary statistics are for 1995. Variable names are defined in Table 1. Statistical
significance is indicated by the t-statistics in parenthesis.  Regressions include 2-digit SIC
codes, not shown.  Asterisks (***,  *,  *) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Independent Variables:  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat  Coef  t-Stat
Intercept  3.11  0.18  0.99  2.66  0.74"  1.88  0.93  2.37
Ln(ASSETS)  -0.41  -7.47  -0.44  -7.80  -0.22  -3.41  -0.41T  -7.30
EMPLOYGR5  1.25  2.45  1.22  2.41  0.87  1.72  1.46...  2.85
CURRAT  -0.39  -5.40  -0.38  -5.31  -0.35  -4.84  -0.37  -5.20
INVENTURN  0.0  r  . 3.72  0.01-  4.04  0.00  2.77  -0.0  9  -2.22
MKTBK  -0.10  -2.48  -0.10  -2.45  0.01  3.49
RDSAL  -2.61  -2.88
D-DIVPAY  -5.77
D-PREDIV  0o99  3.25
Percentage Concordant:  75.9%  77.0%  79.2%  72.6%
36FiQure 1:  Maximum  Loan  AmountS  Secured  and UnsecutLed ____Maximd 
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